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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[I]llegal aliens are those who . . . are likely to maintain no 
permanent address in this country, elude detection through an assumed 
identity, and—already living outside the law—resort to illegal activities 
to maintain a livelihood . . . one seeking to arrange an assassination 
would be especially eager to hire someone who had little commitment to 
this nation’s political institutions and who could disappear afterwards 
without a trace.2 
 
In June 2011, evidently influenced by a fear of stealthy alien 
assassins, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that undocumented 
residents lack Second Amendment rights under the Constitution.3  In 
upholding the 1986 amendments to the federal Omnibus Crime Control 
Act, which denied undocumented residents the right to bear arms,4 the 
Fifth Circuit’s ruling broke new ground in the circuit courts based on 
how it came to that decision.  Judge Garwood’s majority opinion upheld 
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), declaring that 
undocumented residents are not “people” under the Second Amendment.5  
This Comment proposes that the decision in United States v. Portillo-
Munoz misinterpreted the recent guidance of the United States Supreme 
Court regarding gun rights, and that this misreading creates uncertainty 
regarding the constitutional rights of undocumented persons in the 
United States. 
This Comment emphasizes the need for a resolution that fairly 
balances constitutional rights with necessary limitations.  Part II 
introduces the reader to Portillo-Munoz, the first decision made by the 
federal appellate courts on the issue of whether the Second Amendment 
applies to undocumented immigrants.  The section then discusses the 
                                                                                                             
 2 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised 
(June 29, 2011) (citing United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
 3 Id. at 442. 
 4 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (as amended 1986); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 
563 (1977); see also Scott Jacobs, Toward A More Reasonable Approach to Gun 
Control: Canada As A Model, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 328– 29 (1995) 
(“The 1986 amendments expanded the classes of persons prohibited from selling, 
shipping, or receiving firearms to include illegal aliens, veterans who had received a 
dishonorable discharge, and persons who had renounced their U.S. citizenship.”). 
 5 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442. 
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second federal appellate court analysis of this same issue6 by the Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. Huitron-Guizar,7 which firmly grounds its 
reasoning in Supreme Court precedent.8  Part III analyzes several errors 
of Portillo-Munoz court’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and 
considers other possible formulations of constitutional rights.  This 
Comment concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Huitron-Guizar 
is more appropriate than the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Portillo-Munoz. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. United States v. Portillo-Munoz 
On July 10, 2010, Armando Portillo-Munoz, a ranch hand, was 
“spinning around” on his motorcycle in Dimmit, Texas, when he was 
approached by the police. 9   The police officers found a .22 caliber 
handgun in his vehicle, and a dollar bill with a white powdery substance 
inside the folds.10  Portillo-Munoz admitted to being a citizen of Mexico 
who was illegally present in the United States.11  He was arrested and 
charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon and possession of a 
controlled substance.12  Prior to this arrest, Portillo-Munoz had obtained 
the gun to protect the chickens on the ranch from coyotes.13  He was 
sentenced to ten months imprisonment, followed by three years of 
supervised release.14 
On appeal, Portillo-Munoz argued that his conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), a federal gun law, violated his right to bear arms 
under the Second Amendment, 15  which provides: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”16  The provision 
under which he was convicted states that it is “unlawful for any person . . 
. who, being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the United States . . . 
to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or 
                                                                                                             
 6 The Eight Circuit also affirmed a conviction of an undocumented immigrant under 
the federal law in United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011); however, it 
merely affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit. 
 7 678 F.3d 1164, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 8 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990). 
 9 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 438. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 439. 
 12 Id. 
 13 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”17   Portillo-Munoz argued 
that, despite his illegal status, he should be included in the definition of 
“the people” who are entitled by the Second Amendment to keep and 
bear arms.18    He argued that, in the past, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the concept of “people” to include more than just the nation’s citizenry,19 
and that the Fifth Circuit itself had previously employed a broader test to 
determine which “people” were due the Fourth Amendment’s similarly-
worded protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.20 
As a matter of first impression in the federal circuits, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Section 
922(g)(5), upholding the federal ban on gun possession by 
undocumented immigrants in the United States.21  The court based its 
holding primarily on the recent Supreme Court case District of Columbia 
v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment conferred an 
individual right to bear arms independent from a person’s involvement in 
a militia.22  Justice Scalia, writing for the Heller majority, stated that 
“whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it 
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”23  Yet 
while the Heller decision effectively overruled certain gun restrictions in 
the District of Columbia, the Court took care to confine the scope of its 
decision to individuals denied firearms prior to its holding.24  The Court 
stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”25  In a 
footnote to this statement, the Court added that those served “only as 
examples” and that the “list does not purport to be exhaustive.”26 
                                                                                                             
 17 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 
 18 Brief for Petitioner at 10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-10086). 
 19 Id. at 12. 
 20 Id 
 21 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442. 
 22 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 23 Id. at 635. 
 24 See id. (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the 
home violates the Second Amendment. . . . Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from 
the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his 
handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.”). 
 25 Id. at 626–27. 
 26 Id. at 627 n. 26. 
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The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the Heller decision, any 
Second Amendment rights available to U.S. citizens should remain 
foreclosed to undocumented residents like Portillo-Munoz.27  The court 
specifically stated that the “language in Heller invalidates Portillo’s 
attempt to extend the protections of the Second Amendment to 
undocumented residents,” as “[u]ndocumented residents are not ‘law-
abiding, responsible citizens’ or ‘members of the political 
community.’” 28   The Fifth Circuit held that the Heller decision, in 
addition to affirming the Second Amendment as an individual right, also 
reinterpreted the meaning of the phrase “the people,” at least for 
purposes of the Second Amendment.29  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the word “people,” in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment,30 “indicated that the same analysis 
would extend to the text of the Second Amendment.”31  Nevertheless, the 
court declined to analogize the identical wording of the two amendments, 
instead declaring, “[t]he Second Amendment grants an affirmative right 
to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a 
protective right against abuses by the government.”32   Based on this 
perceived distinction between the two amendments, as well as its citizen-
focused interpretation of Heller, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the 
broader definition of “the people” embraced by Supreme Court 
precedent.33 
B. United States v. Huitron-Guizar 
Nearly one year later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached 
the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit regarding the Second 
Amendment, but did so using a less categorical approach.  In March 
2011, pursuant to a warrant, law enforcement officials searched the home 
of Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar, a Mexican citizen who had lived in the 
United States since age three.  The search turned up three firearms.34  
The police also discovered that Huitron-Guizar was undocumented, and 
he was charged with violating § 922(g)(5).35 
                                                                                                             
 27 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 28 Id. at 440 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 644). 
 29 Id. at 440. 
 30 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .”) with U.S. CONST. amend. 
II (“ . . . the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 31 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 32 Id. at 441. 
 33 See supra note 27. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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The Tenth Circuit upheld his conviction, while avoiding a 
determination of whether the Second Amendment excludes Huitron-
Guizar as an undocumented resident.36  The court specifically refuted the 
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Heller, noting that “aliens were not part 
of [Heller’s] calculus.”37  The court also stated that an “even greater 
reason not to read an unwritten holding into Heller is that the question 
seems large and complicated.” 38   Noting that the history of gun 
ownership and citizenship requirements of the colonial era were not 
discussed by either party, the court declined to answer a “question of 
such far-reaching dimensions without a full record and adversarial 
argument.”39  Instead, the court upheld § 922(g)(5) by employing an 
intermediate scrutiny analysis, finding that the firearm ban was 
“substantially related to an important” government ends of crime control 
and public safety.40 
C. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
not implicated by a search that targets a noncitizen that occurs outside 
the nation’s borders. 41   In this case, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration arrested a Mexican citizen who was believed to be a 
leader of a large and violent narcotrafficking operation. 42   Verdugo-
Urquidez was arrested in Mexico by local police officers and transported 
to California, where United States Marshal Service arrested him and held 
him for trial.43  American and Mexican police officers searched his house 
in Mexico without a warrant, and Verdugo-Urquidez sought to have the 
incriminating documents suppressed from his trial in the United States.44 
The Supreme Court ruled that Verdugo-Urquidez did not qualify as 
one of “the people” protected by the “Fourth Amendment [or] the First 
and Second Amendments.”45   The plurality of the Court, however, did 
not make that determination based solely on the defendant’s lack of 
United States citizenship, and instead used a “sufficient connections” 
test, finding that Verdugo-Urquidez could not be considered one of “the 
                                                                                                             
 36 Id. at 1170. 
 37 Id. at 1168. 
 38 Id. at 1169. 
 39 Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1169. 
 40 Id. 
 41 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990). 
 42 Id. at 262. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 262–63. 
 45 Id. at 265. 
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people” because he was not a member of the “class of persons who are 
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”46  
 Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority, but expressed 
dissatisfaction that the majority focused on the defendant’s status, and 
not the government’s conduct.47  The majority, however, did not seem 
eager to apply the “sufficient connections” test to noncitizens who reside 
in the country illegally, and in fact, seemed to back away from prior case 
law, which assumed that illegally-residing aliens have Fourth 
Amendment rights.48  Having just propounded a test based on sufficient 
connections, the Court refused to carve out a special exception for 
individuals residing in the United States illegally, who in many cases 
may have been able to show sufficient connections to the country.  In the 
end, the Court neither affirmatively granted Fourth Amendment 
protection to undocumented residents, nor categorically barred them 
from protection under the constitutional provision.49 
D. Post-Verdugo-Urquidez 
Twenty-one years later, the Fifth Circuit, in Portillo-Munoz, 
interpreted the Heller decision as clarifying the Verdugo-Urquidez 
standard of “sufficient connection” in regard to undocumented 
residents. 50   Prior to Heller, a court may have inquired into the 
connections of an alien – resident or otherwise – to determine if he was 
sufficiently connected to the United States to be part of the national 
community.51  The Portillo-Munoz court, however, interpreted Heller as 
                                                                                                             
 46 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 47 See id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given the history of our Nation’s 
concern over warrantless and unreasonable searches, explicit recognition of ‘the right of 
the people’ to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the 
importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert 
it.”). 
 48 Id. at 272 (“Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive of how 
the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States 
if such a claim were squarely before us.”). 
 49 Id. at 272–73 (“Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protections, their situation is different from respondent’s. The illegal aliens 
in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted 
some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country 
that might place him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”) 
 50 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 51 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 2010 WL 4852390 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 10, 2010); Veiga 
v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff’d sub nom. 
Veiga v. World Meteorological Organization, 368 F. App’x 189 (2d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1265 (D. Utah 2003) aff’d, 386 F.3d 
953 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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closing the door to any claims brought by undocumented United States 
residents.52 
Though Heller quotes the Verdugo-Urquidez standard of the “class 
of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community,” 53  Justice Scalia paraphrased the quote when he 
restated that “the people,” as a term of art, “unambiguously refers to all 
members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”54  Based 
on this pronouncement, the Portillo-Munoz court stated that the sufficient 
connections test of the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable to an 
alien illegally present in the United States. 55   This limitation on the 
sufficient connections test, coupled with the Supreme Court’s reference 
in Heller to citizens,56 foreclosed any possibility that Mr. Portillo-Munoz 
is a member of “the people” under either the Second or Fourth 
Amendment. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the Fifth Circuit based its holding that undocumented 
residents lack Second Amendment rights on the Heller decision, a close 
reading of Heller does not support that proposition.  Banning individuals 
residing in the United States illegally from owning firearms may seem 
reasonable, but any such prohibition should result from a careful 
weighing of the relevant governmental and societal interests at stake.  It 
cannot simply be the result of a blanket policy of excluding all rights and 
privileges to those who lack documentation.  Certainly, mere 
constitutional semantics should not control the outcome when several 
fundamental rights are at stake.  The Heller decision, which expanded 
the Second Amendment as an individual right to self-defense, cannot 
also be plausibly used to curtail that same right for undocumented 
residents. 
                                                                                                             
 52 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442. 
 53 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265). 
 54 Id. at 580. 
 55 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (“ . . . neither this court nor the Supreme 
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another 
nation who entered and remained in the United States illegally.”). 
 56 See id. at 440 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635) (“The Court held the Second 
Amendment ‘surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”). 
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A. The Text of Heller Does Not Support a Narrower Reading of 
“The People” 
To support its holding, the Fifth Circuit pointed to two examples in 
the Heller decision in which the language employed would exclude 
undocumented residents.57  Specifically, the court pointed to Heller’s use 
of the phrases “law-abiding, responsible citizens”58 and “members of the 
political community”59 to establish the proposition that a person cannot 
be a member of “the people” unless he is also a citizen.  The Fifth Circuit 
reinforced this idea by concluding that “[a]liens who enter or remain in 
this country illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that 
word is commonly understood.”60 
The Portillo-Munoz majority offers no further guidelines on who is 
“commonly understood” to be an American.  Nor does the court offer 
any textual support for this declaration, leaving the skeptical reader with 
a suspicion that the common understanding is common only to three 
circuit judges.  One could presume that by “American,” the judges are 
referring to those who have United States citizenship.  The phrases from 
Heller that the Fifth Circuit majority cites, however, do not state that the 
person who qualifies as a member of “the people” must simply be a 
citizen.  Instead, the citizen must also be “law-abiding” and 
“responsible,” and should also be a “member of the political 
community[.]”  Although “law-abiding” certainly corresponds to the 
current law that prohibits felons from gun ownership,61 it is difficult to 
translate the other two characteristics into workable tests for who should 
be allowed to own a gun.  “Responsible” is a highly subjective 
characteristic that is not necessarily correlated with gun ownership at 
all.62  Similarly, no one contends that being a member of a political 
community (e.g., having voting rights) should be one of the determinants 
                                                                                                             
 57 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 58 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“The Court held the Second Amendment ‘surely 
elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of hearth and home.”). 
 59 See id. at 580 (“What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that 
mention ‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political 
community, not an unspecified subset.”). 
 60 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 
 62 Garen J. Wintemute.  Association between firearm ownership, firearm-related risk 
and risk reduction behaviours and alcohol-related risk behaviours.  INJURY PREVENTION- 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNALS (Jun. 13, 2011).  
http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/early/2011/06/13/ip.2010.031443.abstract. 
(finding that gun owners are twice as likely to participate in binge drinking, chronic 
heavy drinking, and drinking and driving than are non-gun owners). 
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for gun access.  So, then, why are courts so quick to conflate citizenship 
with Second Amendment rights?  
Another concern with basing a new constitutional rule on only a 
few words of dicta is that words are often ambiguous.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary, for example, defines “citizen” in its first, three-part 
definition as “an inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town; [especially] one 
possessing civic rights and privileges, a burgess or freeman of a city[,]” 
as “a townsman, as opposed to a countryman[;]” and finally, a “civilian 
as distinguished from a soldier; in earlier times also distinguished from a 
member of the landed nobility or gentry.” 63   Only then does the 
dictionary, in its second definition, discuss what the Portillo-Munoz 
majority views as the correct interpretation: “A member of a state, an 
enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an alien . . . .”64  The 
distinction between “citizen” meaning “person who possesses United 
States citizenship” and “citizen” meaning “everyday person” should not 
come as a surprise to anyone accustomed to reading bombastic Supreme 
Court decisions,65 especially those written by Justice Scalia.66  The word 
“citizen” may resonate with more grandiosity than its simpler, yet more 
accurate, counterpart “person.”  That, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the Court was intending to equate the two concepts. 
A survey of numerous other majority opinions authored by Justice 
Scalia reveals a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which “citizen” does not 
denote anything other than a simple inhabitant of the United States.  In 
Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 67  for example, Justice Scalia 
stated, “[t]his accords, we think, with our ‘takings’ jurisprudence, which 
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens 
regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of 
rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property.”68  One who 
performs even a cursory survey of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions is 
sure to find that this overbroad use of “citizen” is not uncommon.69  
                                                                                                             
 63 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 249 (2d ed. 1989). 
 64 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 250 (2d ed. 1989). 
 65 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“Patently offensive, 
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, 
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”) (emphasis added). 
 66 See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects.  N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:40 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/. 
 67 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 68 Id. at 1027 (emphasis added). 
 69 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2755 (2011) (“The 
Republic would require virtuous citizens, which necessitated proper training from 
childhood.”) (emphasis added); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (“For 
example, a law-abiding citizen might observe a crime during the days or weeks before a 
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Patriotically spirited as the word “citizen” may be, it should not be read 
literally as a constitutional test. 
To find support for the idea that the word “citizen” cannot always 
be taken at face value, one merely needs to examine other uses of the 
word “citizen” in the Heller decision to see if the word is interchangeable 
with the phrase “person with United States citizenship.”  For example, 
the opinion states: “The District [of Columbia] law, by contrast, far from 
imposing a minor fine, threatens citizens with a year in prison (five years 
for a second violation) for even obtaining a gun in the first place.”70  If 
one uses the strict reading of “citizen” that the Fifth Circuit requires, then 
the statement becomes: “The District law . . . threatens persons with 
United States citizenship with a year in prison . . . .”  Since the District of 
Columbia statute does not in fact threaten only bona fide citizens with 
such a punishment (the actual language uses the word “person”),71 one 
cannot escape the impression that Justice Scalia used the word “citizen” 
for the purpose of rhetorical flourish at least once in Heller.  An example 
                                                                                                             
scheduled flight abroad.”) (emphasis added); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 170 
(2008) (“Moreover, even though several state constitutions also prohibited unreasonable 
searches and seizures, citizens who claimed officers had violated state restrictions on 
arrest did not claim that the violations also ran afoul of the state constitutions.”) 
(emphasis added); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (“The interests protected by 
the knock-and-announce rule include human life and limb (because an unannounced 
entry may provoke violence from a surprised resident), property (because citizens 
presumably would open the door upon an announcement, whereas a forcible entry may 
destroy it), and privacy and dignity”) (emphasis added); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”) (emphasis added); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The 
Constitution thus contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain 
accountable to its own citizens.”) (emphasis added); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 592 (1992) (“Similarly, [petitioners’s] professional backgrounds in wildlife 
preservation . . . also make it likely-at least far more likely than for the average citizen-
that they would choose to visit these areas of the world where species are vanishing.”) 
(emphasis added); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (“Mendenhall 
establishes that the test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not 
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but 
whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 
person.”) (emphasis added); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 
365, 368 (1991) (“COA was not alone in urging this course; concerned about the city’s 
recent explosion of billboards, a number of citizens including writers of articles and 
editorials in local newspapers advocated restrictions.”) (emphasis added); Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (“Although a probation officer is not an impartial 
magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the 
ordinary citizen.”) (emphasis added). 
 70 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). 
 71 See D.C. Code § 7-2507.06 (2007) (“A person who . . . possesses a pistol, or 
firearm that could otherwise be registered, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned . . . .”). 
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of similar flourish occurs when Heller states that “we do not read the 
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any 
sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to 
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”72  Again, Justice 
Scalia likely did not intend for that one sentence to establish that the First 
Amendment protects only the right of persons with United States 
citizenship to speak for any purpose.73 
Even supposing that Heller intended that the language in its opinion 
should be taken literally, there are still practical problems.  Assuming for 
the sake of argument that Heller actually holds that only those persons 
with United States citizenship should be allowed guns, a conflict arises 
when this new pronouncement is read against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), the 
federal firearms law that Portillo-Munoz violated.  The Code provision 
states that it is “unlawful for any person . . . being an alien . . . illegally or 
unlawfully in the United States . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm or 
ammunition . . . .”74  If Heller restricts guns to United States citizens, and 
Section 922(g)(5) allows guns to any alien who is not in the country 
illegally, then the two in conjunction create a twilight zone of gun 
legality for the nation’s 12.5 million legal permanent residents (those 
immigrants who are lawfully in the United States but do not have 
citizenship).75  Far from being hypothetical, this issue has already come 
up multiple times in the federal courts, and for the concerned legal 
permanent resident, who may or may not be committing a felony by 
simply owning a gun, this uncertainty can spell out the difference 
between removal from the United States and full citizenship rights.76 
                                                                                                             
 72 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
 73 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (“But once an alien lawfully 
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the 
First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 74 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(2012). 
 75 See Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2009, 
Department of Homeland Security (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_pe_2009.pdf. 
 76 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(“Because aliens in the process of applying for legalization of their immigration status 
may not be deported, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(d) & 1255a(e), they are not unlawfully in the 
United States and thereby subject to prosecution under § 922(a)(6)”).  See also United 
States v. Brissett, 720 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that alien whose 
application for legalization was pending at the time he purchased firearm could not be 
prosecuted under § 922(g)(5)). 
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B.  The Text of Heller is Not a Constitutional Test for Noncitizens 
The Fifth Circuit is the first federal appellate level court to review 
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5) as it pertains to aliens living 
unlawfully in the United States.77  A number of district courts, however, 
have already upheld Section 922(g)(5) as constitutional post-Heller.78  
The primary rationale in these cases has been split between two camps: 
those courts that have upheld the disallowance of alien gun rights based 
on the presumed constitutionality of Section 922(g)(5),79 and those courts 
that have upheld the disallowance by holding that undocumented 
residents are not members of “the people” as defined by the Second 
Amendment. 80   The Fifth Circuit based its holding on the latter 
reasoning, which misconstrues precedent and creates a precarious 
constitutional position for undocumented residents in that region of the 
country.81 
The constitutional rights afforded to noncitizens both today and in 
the history of the United States can be described as murky at best.82  The 
Supreme Court has stated for more than a century that it will grant great 
deference to acts of Congress in the immigration sphere83 in what is 
referred to as the “plenary power doctrine.”84  At the same time, the 
Court has not wholly abandoned its role in adjudicating some 
fundamental constitutional issues involving noncitizens in the United 
                                                                                                             
 77 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439. 
 78 See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Higuera, No. 1:11-CR-182-TCB-CCH, 2011 WL 
3329286 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011) (listing eight cases upholding § 922(g)(5) prior to July 
2011). 
 79 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 JNE JSM, 2010 WL 4720223 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Even if illegal aliens fall within the ambit of the Second 
Amendment, § 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional as a ‘presumptively lawful regulatory 
measure’ prohibiting the possession of firearms.”). 
 80 See, e.g., United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 
411112 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (“First, the defendant has not shown that as an illegal 
alien he has any Second Amendment rights, before or after Heller. Plaintiff has not 
shown that illegal aliens are among ‘the people’ contemplated by the Second 
Amendment.”) 
 81 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 82 See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from 
Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 90 (2010) (“. . . a 
closer examination of the century-old jurisprudence suggests that the spectrum itself is 
replete with inconsistencies and is utterly disordered.”). 
 83 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (“Such matters are 
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune 
from judicial inquiry or interference.”); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (“When once it is established that congress possesses the power to 
pass an act, our province ends with its construction and its application to cases as they are 
presented for determination.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Meredith K. Olafson, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the 
Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 433 (1999). 
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States. 85   Since 1886, the Supreme Court has recognized both that 
noncitizens have due process rights under the Fourteen Amendment and 
that the judiciary has authority to rule on those claims.86  In recent years, 
the Supreme Court has continued to expand the applicability of due 
process claims.  For example, in Plyler v. Doe,87 the Court overturned a 
Texas law that barred undocumented children from attending public 
schools.  Again ruling on the paramount importance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court stated “[w]hatever his status under the 
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of 
that term.”88  The majority vindicated the principle that, in addition to the 
traditional due process guarantees to all persons in the United States, the 
Equal Protection Clause also provides constitutional safeguards to a 
person regardless of their immigration status. 89   The Court pressed 
forward, stating: 
In concluding that “all persons within the territory of the United 
States,” including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we 
reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State.90 
The Plyler decision represents the Court’s reaffirmation of the 
inviolability of certain rights – namely, the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments – that apply without regard to the status of the person 
seeking the protection.  As the Due Process Clause also incorporates 
those provisions of the Bill of Rights to the individual states, 91  the 
                                                                                                             
 85 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (“The plenary authority of 
Congress over aliens . . . is not open to question, but what is challenged here is whether 
Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.”). 
 86 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (“But this court has never held, nor 
must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the 
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental 
principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . These 
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality . . .”). 
 87 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982). 
 88 Id. at 210. 
 89 Id. at 212 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . . 
. and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”). 
 90 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212 (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369). 
 91 See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 
(1982) (“Justice Brennan advocated adoption of what is now commonly described as the 
‘selective incorporation’ theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. That theory, simply put, 
holds that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause fully incorporates all of those 
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Fourteenth Amendment serves as a vehicle to afford noncitizens other 
constitutional protections.92   For example, more than a half-century ago, 
the Supreme Court held that noncitizens have free speech rights under 
the First Amendment.93  The Fourth Amendment has also historically 
protected noncitizens.  In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the exclusionary rule was required to correct Fourth 
Amendment violations in deportation proceedings.94  While the Court 
ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment violation remedy was 
unnecessary because it was not a criminal trial, it decided the case 
explicitly under the impression that aliens possess Fourth Amendment 
rights.95  The Court specifically stated that “[i]mportant as it is to protect 
the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing 
indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation 
proceedings will contribute materially to that end.”96 
Far from being a groundbreaking holding, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
merely reaffirmed the strong principle of jurisprudence that, even though 
the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation may be up for debate, the 
right itself is not.  Other courts have affirmed the notion that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the government and is not concerned with the 
status of the person seeking its protection.97  The Second Circuit held that 
                                                                                                             
guarantees of the Bill of Rights deemed to be fundamental and thereby makes those 
guarantees applicable to the states.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Bridges v. State of Cal., 314 U.S. 252, 280 (1941) (“Which one of the 
various limitations upon state power introduced by the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs 
the First . . . only the Due Process Clause assures constitutional protection of civil 
liberties to aliens and corporations.”)  See also Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1087 
(7th Cir. 1977) (“A lawfully admitted resident alien, of course, is a person within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Therefore, he enjoys the protection of those 
amendments in the Bill of Rights which are incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment so as to be applicable to the states, at least in matters wholly unrelated to 
immigration and naturalization.”). 
 93 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“Freedom of speech and of press is 
accorded aliens residing in this country.”). 
 94 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984). 
 95 See id.. 
 96 Id. (emphasis added). 
 97 See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“In the 
absence of probable cause or consent, that search violated the petitioner’s [a Mexican 
citizen with a valid United States work permit] Fourth Amendment right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Abel v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 247 (1960) (“This is a protection given not only to citizens 
but to aliens as well, as the opinion of the Court by implication holds. The right ‘of the 
people’ covered by the Fourth Amendment certainly gives security to aliens in the same 
degree that ‘person’ in the Fifth and ‘the accused’ in the Sixth Amendments also protects 
them.”); see Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[s]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment 
in common with citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate must be controlled 
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the right attaches even when the person is in the country illegally: “An 
alien within the United States has standing to assert a violation of 
constitutional rights even if his presence is illegal . . . . The Government 
here does not suggest that appellee is not entitled to the same Fourth 
Amendment protection as are citizens.”98 
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-
Urquidez demanded a reexamination of its past holdings regarding 
noncitizens and the Fourth Amendment.  This holding represented both a 
step forward and a step back for undocumented residents seeking 
constitutional parity with United States citizens.  On one hand, it clearly 
established a definition of “the people” for the purposes of the First, 
Second, and Fourth Amendments. 99   The Court stated that, without 
mentioning any citizenship requirement, “the people” “refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.”100  The Court further held that Verdugo-Urquidez 
was not a member of “the people” because, as an alien who had not come 
to the United States willingly, he had “no previous significant voluntary 
connection with the United States . . . .”101  Based on that reasoning, the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply to him. 
The Court, however, refused to acknowledge the inescapable 
conclusion that, under its new holding, an undocumented resident could 
establish a Fourth Amendment right provided that he or she meet could 
establish a sufficient connection with the community.  Additionally, the 
Court tried to undo the scope of several decades of precedent by 
reopening the question of previously settled law regarding the 
universality of the Fourth Amendment.  The plurality opinion stated that 
the Lopez-Mendoza case decided five years earlier,102 which presumed 
that undocumented residents could have violable Fourth Amendment 
rights, did not in fact decide whether the Fourth Amendment could apply 
to undocumented residents.  The Court stated that even though “a 
majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
illegal aliens in the United States . . . [o]ur decision did not expressly 
                                                                                                             
by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law 
enforcement officials.”; see Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 81 (BIA 1979) 
(“Thus, even though the suppression of evidence may be the most cumbersome and 
unproven tool of deterrence, it is the approach most likely to be pursued by an alien 
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because of its ‘windfall’ effect.”). 
 98 United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 99 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 100 Id. at 265. 
 101 Id. at 271. 
 102 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
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address the proposition gleaned by the court below.”103  This clever bit of 
revisionist jurisprudence allowed the Court to reinvent the wheel and 
produce the substantial connections test, which would subsequently 
govern decisions determining who is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The previous section of this Comment supports the proposition that 
many constitutional provisions have traditionally covered noncitizens.  
The Due Process Clause, which applies in full force even to those in the 
country illegally,104 incorporated the majority of the Bill of Rights to the 
States, and most recently the Second Amendment.105  Because of this 
concern over the fundamentality of due process rights, the Supreme 
Court has afforded noncitizens other rights like those granted by the First 
and Fourth Amendments. 106   It is worth noting here that the First 
Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, contains identical wording to 
that of the Second Amendment in describing the “people” to whom it 
applies.  The Supreme Court itself recognized the congruence of these 
amendments when it grouped them together in the Verdugo-Urquidez 
decision, referring to the “‘the people’ protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom 
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments” 
without distinction.107  Absent any other textual distinction, “the people” 
in one amendment surely means “the people,” as both common sense and 
the Supreme Court recognize the term, as “refer[ring] to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
                                                                                                             
 103 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (“The question presented for decision in 
Lopez-Mendoza was limited to whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule 
should be extended to civil deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of 
aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. . . . Even one whose presence in this 
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional 
protection.”) (emphasis added). 
 105 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“Unless 
considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that 
protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the 
Federal Government and the States . . . We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in 
Heller.”). 
 106 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 148 (1945). 
 107 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
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developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.”108 
Therefore, if the Portillo-Muniz court correctly interpreted Heller as 
removing noncitizens from the category of “people” in the Bill of Rights, 
then the logical implication of this revelation is that the Court took away 
not only the Second Amendment from noncitizens, but also the 
longstanding protections of the First and Fourth Amendments.  The 
Supreme Court could not have intended to generate such wide-reaching 
implications for so many constitutional rights. The question, then, is how 
do the courts determine who has Second Amendment rights. 
C. Five Tests for Determining Who Should Obtain Second 
Amendment Rights 
Today, Section 922(g)(5) forecloses the Second Amendment’s right 
to bear arms from undocumented immigrants. 109   Some courts 
considering the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(5) upheld the federal 
law as a presumptively valid exercise of congressional power.110  Some, 
like the Portillo-Munoz court, went so far as to say that those 
undocumented residents are not “people” at all for the purposes of the 
Bill of Rights, and have ruled on that basis.111  Neither route, however, is 
ideal.  The first rationale seems less than reasonable when one considers 
that the original intent of the firearm ban was to keep guns out of the 
hands of people who are dangerous to society.112  The second line of 
thinking, involving a perversion of the word “people,” is equally 
unsatisfactory because of its incongruence with Supreme Court 
precedent. 
A survey of the law indicates that there are at least four other 
potential tests for determining who should be afforded Second 
Amendment and other constitutional rights.  These are: (1) the “sufficient 
connections” test developed by the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality; (2) the 
                                                                                                             
 108 Id. 
 109 See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(5). 
 110 See United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-MR-DCK-1, 2008 WL 
4539663, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (“Although the Court need not look beyond 
Heller in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is important to note that the Fourth 
Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on several occasions and 
squarely rejected each challenge.”); see also United States v. Wells (rejecting Commerce 
Clause argument); see also United States v. Bostic (rejecting Tenth Amendment 
argument); see also United States v. Mitchell (rejecting Fifth Amendment Due Process 
claim) (citations omitted). 
 111 See United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at 
*2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (“Plaintiff has not shown that illegal aliens are among ‘the 
people’ contemplated by the Second Amendment.”). 
 112 See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977). 
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“governed” test of the Verdugo-Urquidez dissent; (3) the test of the 
“active versus passive right” espoused by the Portillo-Munoz court; and 
(4) the “intermediate scrutiny” test.  Two propositions are not discussed 
here: that undocumented residents should not receive any constitutional 
protections; or alternatively, that the Second Amendment is not 
applicable to anyone outside of a militia context.  Despite the strength of 
the argument for at least one of these propositions,113 neither are viable 
constitutional positions today in light of both longstanding and more 
recent cases.114  Of the four potential approaches, the Tenth Circuit’s 
intermediate-scrutiny analysis is preferable, as it allows courts to best 
examine the complex nature of the issue. 
1. Sufficient Connections Test – Verdugo-Urquidez Plurality 
In deciding that a Mexican citizen did not have Fourth Amendment 
protection in his home outside the United States, the Verdugo-Urquidez 
plurality held that “the people” under the Fourth Amendment are 
members of “a class of persons who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to 
be considered part of that community.”115  The Court also suggested that 
this test would apply with equal force to other similarly worded 
amendments, including the Second Amendment.116 
One might commend this decision as an arguably sensible 
compromise to constitutional rights for aliens – namely, that an 
undocumented resident, despite his lack of official entry, may be 
                                                                                                             
 113 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any 
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than 
eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not 
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or 
that its use could contribute to the common defense.”);  See also David Yassky, The 
Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
588, 589 (2000) (“The question at the heart of this debate is whether the Amendment 
restricts the government’s ability to regulate the private possession of firearms. Since at 
least 1939 – when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller, its only decision 
squarely addressing the scope of the right to “keep and bear Arms” – the answer to that 
question has been an unqualified ‘no.’ Courts have brushed aside Second Amendment 
challenges to gun control legislation, reading the Amendment to forbid only laws that 
interfere with states’ militias.”). 
 114 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Dist. of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
 115 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 116 Id. (“While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive suggests that “the 
people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, 
and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . .”). 
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properly viewed as a member of the community.  This standard reflects 
the reasonable view that not all undocumented immigrants are created 
equal, and that an undocumented resident of the United States who holds 
a job and pays Social Security taxes should not be categorically grouped 
with a drug runner who involuntarily entered the country.117  The former 
provides some benefit to the community;118 the latter certainly does not.  
This view reflects a realistic notion of the complexity of immigration 
issues today.119  It is also in line with the congressional approach to 
removing aliens, which includes provisions to cancel an alien’s 
deportation based on certain community ties.120  This approach would 
presumably create an incentive, similar to the one provided for by the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
for undocumented residents to maintain community presence and obey 
the nation’s laws in the hope that these actions could someday be 
counted in their favor.  Because of its resemblance to the current law (as 
well as others recently proposed),121 the sufficient connections test meets 
the expectations of those undocumented residents who are more familiar 
with the well-defined rules of immigration law than the vagaries of the 
Supreme Court’s holdings.      
The sufficient connections test, however, is not without its critics.  
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan in Verdugo-Urquidez, assailed the 
                                                                                                             
 117 Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese 
Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 125 (2010) (“All three 
branches of government do their own share of crafting immigration laws and policies. 
Together, about a century ago, they created this notion that some immigrants are more 
alien than others and repeated the same theme consistently throughout the last century.”). 
 118 See, e.g.,  Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security With 
Billions, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 5, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/05/business/05immigration.html?ex=1270353600&en=
78c87ac4641dc383&ei=5090. 
 119 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n. 17 (1982) (quoting Joint Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981) (testimony of 
William French Smith, Attorney General)(“We have neither the resources, the capability, 
nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have 
become, in effect, members of the community.”). 
 120 See 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1) (stating that the Attorney General may cancel removal 
of a deportable alien if the alien has been present in the United States for the last ten 
years, has been a person of good moral character, and establishes that removal would 
“result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or 
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”). 
 121 See Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 729, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (proposing conditional permanent residency to certain illegal aliens who arrived in 
the country as minors, have graduated from high school, and maintain a good moral 
character). 
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uncertainty in the rule, stating that “[t]he Court admits that ‘the people’ 
extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its 
‘sufficient connection’ test unclear.” 122   Indeed, only the most self-
assured undocumented resident would feel safe under that test; all others 
would be left with the nagging suspicion that their connections to the 
community might be deemed insufficient.  This uncertainty, of course, 
will not be confined only to those undocumented residents; law 
enforcement officers, for example, will also feel the pinch from this test.  
To government agents, this additional wrinkle in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence will only add to the unease produced by not knowing what 
course of action they can pursue when confronted with a suspect of 
ambiguous citizenship.123   
Other critics have argued that the sufficient connections test 
“created an expansive gray area[,]” which has led to inconsistent lower 
court rulings.124  A brief look at a few examples of post-Verdugo cases 
demonstrates that the sufficient connections test has shown itself to be of 
little predictive value for determining who will obtain the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.  In one case, the District Court of Vermont ruled 
on the availability of the exclusionary rule for a Canadian citizen arrested 
in a United States airport with a fraudulently-procured visa. 125   The 
district court, granting the motion to suppress evidence from the illegal 
search, stated that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the 
noncitizen because “the defendants’ presence in the United States was 
voluntary, and they had gained admission, albeit surreptitiously, for a 
temporary visit as tourists.  Such connections . . . constitute the type of 
connections which would vest in aliens the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”126  In contrast, a Texas appellate court upheld 
the conviction of a Colombian national who had been unlawfully present 
in the United States for two years.127  Although the court’s Verdugo-
                                                                                                             
 122 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 123 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975) (“In this 
case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent’s car: the apparent 
Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable 
grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens.”). 
 124 Douglas I. Koff, Post-Verdugo-Urquidez: The Sufficient Connection Test – 
Substantially Ambiguous, Substantially Unworkable, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435, 
471 (1994) (“Although it is easy to determine when an alien’s connection has not reached 
the level of Verdugo-Urquidez’s, it is difficult to determine whether the alien who has 
developed more of a connection with the United States than Verdugo-Urquidez is 
afforded Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 125 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789 (D. Vt. 1993) aff’d, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
 126 Id. at 793 n. 1. 
 127 Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991) review granted in part, 
decision vacated, 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
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Urquidez analysis was ultimately not dispositive, it still stated that the 
defendant would not have standing to challenge the search because he 
“had not been employed during his two years in the United States and 
was living off money given him by his brothers, who were convicted 
drug traffickers or charged with drug trafficking and on fugitive 
status.”128 
The Fifth Circuit has itself produced an important precedential case 
– one cited in the Portillo-Munoz dissent, which suggests that Portillo-
Munoz is one of “the people.”129  In Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, the 
court held that a Mexican citizen who crossed the border into the United 
States once a month had a Fourth Amendment right to pursue a remedy 
when she attempted to cross with a recently invalidated visa.130  The 
court agreed that “her regular and lawful entry of the United States 
pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and her acquiescence in the U.S. 
system of immigration constitute[d] her voluntary acceptance of societal 
obligations, rising to the level of ‘substantial connections.’”131 
One might criticize the Verdugo-Urquidez test for injecting more 
confusion into the area of constitutional rights.  From the above cases, it 
should be clear that there is little predictive value in the test.  A foreign 
national who comes across the border for a few days under false 
pretenses is a member of “the people,”132 while a two-year resident is 
not.133  A Mexican citizen who has never had any intention of developing 
any sort of substantial relationship with the United States becomes one of 
“the people” because her monthly acquiescence to Border Patrol could 
constitute her voluntary acceptance of societal obligations.  The 
Verdugo-Urquidez court’s conflation of several distinct and potentially 
conflicting factors – the sufficient connections, the national community, 
and the voluntary presence – may have made this test too complex for 
lower courts to apply consistently. 
                                                                                                             
 128 Id. at 146 n. 1 (“Appellant demonstrated no meaningful ties to the community and 
we do not find he is entitled to the protection accorded ‘We the people of the United 
States’ as originally intended by the framers of either the federal or state constitutions.”). 
 129 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 445 (2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 130 Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 131 Id. (“There may be cases in which an alien’s connection with the United States is 
so tenuous that he cannot reasonably expect the protection of its constitutional 
guarantees; the nature and duration of Martinez-Aguero’s contacts with the United States, 
however, are sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
 132 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 798 (D. Vt. 1993) aff’d, 49 F.3d 54 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
 133 Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991). 
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2. “We the Governed” – The Verdugo-Urquidez Dissent 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, the dissenters in Verdugo-Urquidez, 
proposed a broader and simpler test for determining who are “people” for 
the purposes of the Bill of Rights.  They stated that Verdugo-Urquidez 
should be considered included in the protections because  “our 
Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him 
accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a 
member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws.”134  The 
dissent argued that whenever agents of the United States government 
seek to enforce U.S. criminal laws upon those outside the citizenry or the 
territoriality, they “in turn are obliged to respect certain correlative 
rights, among them the Fourth Amendment.”135  The dissent thus opted 
for a much simpler rule that, if nothing else, prevents a headache to any 
undocumented resident, law enforcement officer, judge or even frustrated 
law student trying impatiently to determine who is sufficiently connected 
to the United States.  Whenever the authority of the United States tries to 
govern him, the defendant “become[s], quite literally, one of the 
governed.”136 
Besides the clear advantages of simplicity and predictive value, 
there are other reasons to approve of “the governed” test of the dissent.  
Fundamentally, the rule appeals to a sense of “mutuality and 
fundamental fairness that are central to our Nation’s constitutional 
conscience[,]” that one might argue is often absent when it comes to 
considering the rights of noncitizens.137  Perhaps it is the echo of the 
Golden Rule that rings true in the dissent’s statement that “[i]f we expect 
aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey 
our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them.”138  
When viewed against such a statement of basic equity, any argument for 
denying rights to less-connected aliens seems unreasonable. 
The dissent also bolsters its argument with an appeal to history, 
arguing that the majority missed the forest for the trees by suggesting 
that a right so fundamental to the founding of the country should be read 
narrowly.139  Refusing to make a decision based solely on the social 
                                                                                                             
 134 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 286. 
 138 Id. at 284. 
 139 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 287–88 (“Whereas the British Parliament was 
unconstrained, the Framers intended to create a Government of limited powers. 
Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have been inconsistent with the 
Drafters’s fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government’s 
conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern.”). 
182 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:50 
compact theory of the Constitution, Justice Brennan’s dissent (and 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence)140 instead stated that “the Framers of the 
Bill of Rights did not purport to ‘create’ rights” but “[r]ather, they 
designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing 
rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.” 141   Ironically, this 
originalist focus, rejected by Justice Scalia in Verdugo-Urquidez when 
applied to the Fourth Amendment, would twenty years later become his 
main selling point for striking down gun control laws when he stated that 
“it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like 
the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right” and 
“[t]he very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-
existence of the right and declares only that it shall not be infringed.”142 
The major critique of the dissent’s “governed” rule is the refrain 
commonly delivered in response to such idealistic arguments – it is 
“impracticable.” 143   Justice Kennedy, for example, believed that the 
difficulties such as “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available 
to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions 
of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to 
cooperate with foreign officials” would make the Fourth Amendment 
potentially much harder to comply with abroad.144  Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the plurality, took an even more pragmatic approach, holding 
that “[f]or better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in 
which our Government must be able to function effectively in the 
company of sovereign nations.” 145   He continued, “[s]ituations 
threatening to important American interests may arise halfway around 
the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our 
Government require an American response with armed force.”146  This 
point of view would take on heightened importance after the attacks of 
September 11th, as courts began to question just how much 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A government may originate in the 
voluntary compact or assent of the people of several states . . . . But the difficulty in 
asserting it to be a compact between the people of each state, and all the people of the 
other states is, that the constitution itself contains no such expression, and no such 
designation of parties.” (quoting Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 365, p. 335 
(1833)). 
 141 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 288. 
 142 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 
(1876) (“[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner 
dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”). 
 143 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 144 Id. at 278. 
 145 Id. at 275 (citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)). 
 146 Id. at 274. 
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constitutional protection should be afforded when dealing with alleged 
terrorists.147  In many cases, some protections of the Constitution were 
sacrificed to similar concerns of practicality.148 
3. “Affirmative Versus Passive Right” Test – Portillo-Munoz 
Majority 
The Fifth Circuit, while still holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to undocumented residents,149 did not rest its decision on 
the inapplicability of the Verdugo-Urquidez standard alone.  The court, 
perhaps recognizing that it was treading on uncertain ground in such a 
strict reading of the “sufficient connections” test,150 sought to distinguish 
its gun holding, of which there was no contradicting precedent, from its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which was not supported by 
even its own precedent.151  To shore up its interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, the majority stated that “. . . we do not find that the use of 
‘the people’ in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a 
holding that the two amendments cover exactly the same groups of 
people.” 152   The court continued saying that “[t]he purposes of the 
Second and the Fourth Amendment are different[,] . . . .  [t]he Second 
Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the 
Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right against abuses by the 
government.” 153   Because of this difference in intention, the court 
reasoned that it was “reasonable that an affirmative right would be 
extended to fewer groups than would a protective right.”154  One may 
criticize the Portillo-Munoz court’s decision for its inconsistency.  
Essentially, the court states that undocumented residents do not have 
                                                                                                             
 147 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497–98 (2004) (“Today, the Court 
springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the 
federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their jurisdiction-
and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees.”). 
 148 See, e.g., Tung Yin, President Obama’s First Two Years: A Legal Reflection: 
“Anything but Bush?”: The Obama Administration and Guantanamo Bay, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 453 (2011). 
 149 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (“ . . . neither this court nor the Supreme Court 
has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another nation 
who entered and remained in the United States illegally.”). 
 150 Note the unsure language: “Moreover, even if there were precedent for the 
proposition that illegal aliens generally are covered by the Fourth Amendment . . . “; Id. 
at 440. 
 151 See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
a Mexican citizen who had inadvertently attempted an unlawful border crossing still had 
sufficient connections to be protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
 152 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
 153 Id. at 440–41. 
 154 Id. at 441. 
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either Second or Fourth Amendment rights, but that, paradoxically, even 
if undocumented residents do have Fourth Amendment rights, they still 
do not have Second Amendment rights. 
The majority’s affirmative versus passive rights distinction may 
sound convincing at first blush for those who suspect deep down there is 
some difference between brandishing a gun and keeping the government 
out of one’s house.  Portillo-Munoz, however, cited no support for this 
statement.  In fact, this deceptively simple statement comes from the 
Government’s brief, which argued that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is a 
passive, or defensive right that protects the people against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and that ”[i]n contrast, the Second Amendment 
codifies an affirmative right to use arms.  The Government concluded 
that “[a]ccordingly, one cannot define the scope of the Second 
Amendment by analogy to the Fourth [Amendment].”155  For the first 
half of its proposition, the Government cited Verdugo-Urquidez.156  For 
the second half, it cited Heller’s focus on “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens[.]”157  When one searches for a reference to the “affirmative 
right” of the Second Amendment, however, one finds that it does not 
appear until much later, deep into the dissent of Heller.  Justice Stevens, 
dissenting vigorously from the Court’s new vindication of the Second 
Amendment as a personal right,158  stated, “[b]y way of contrast, the 
Fourth Amendment describes a right against governmental interference 
rather than an affirmative right to engage in protected conduct, and so 
refers to a right to protect a purely individual interest.”159  This dissenting 
opinion is the source of the textual support that the Government argues, 
and the Portillo-Munoz majority subsequently ratifies into Fifth Circuit 
law.  While a lower court acts questionably when it decides a case based 
on the dissenting opinion of a Supreme Court ruling, the situation is even 
more suspect when that dissenting opinion runs contrary to the majority 
opinion that the lower court is purporting to affirm.160  The Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 155 Brief for Respondent at 9–10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-10086). 
 156 Id. at 10 (“. . . [t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of 
the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”). 
 157 Id. at 10 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). 
 158 See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 678, 666, 649, 639. 652 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the majority’s analysis as being “simply wrong,” “without any real analysis,” 
“fundamentally fail[ing] to grasp the point,” and “feeble.”). Perhaps most damning, 
Justice Stevens also states “not a word in the constitutional text even arguably supports 
the Court’s overwrought and novel description of the Second Amendment . . . .”). 
 159 Id. at 646 (emphasis added). 
 160 See also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (“it suggests that ‘the people’ 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to 
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used the Heller majority opinion161 for the ruling, and the antithetical 
dissent for the rationale.162 
Thus, the primary disadvantage to the “affirmative versus passive 
right” test is that it lacks any sort of precedential support, even in its own 
circuit.163  On this basis alone, it seems unlikely that any other court 
would use such a rule. If the Supreme Court has repeatedly established 
that the concurrently-passed amendments in the Bill of Rights refer to the 
same people,164 then absent any newly-discovered historical evidence, it 
would seem arbitrary to pick and choose those that will apply only to 
citizens.  This outcome seems inimical to the idea of the Constitution 
creating “a government of laws, and not of men.”165  The “affirmative 
versus passive right” test also opens up the door to the possibility that 
courts could strip away more rights from noncitizens simply by 
designating them as “affirmative,” and not “passive.”  For example, due 
process, though guaranteed to noncitizens since 1886,166 might still be 
someday deemed “affirmative” under this test if certain provisions of due 
process require some active participation of the defendant. 
 D. The Intermediate-Scrutiny Test 
One of the major questions that the Heller majority left unanswered 
is what standard of review should be applied when reviewing gun 
legislation.167  When deciding whether a law impermissibly burdens a 
                                                                                                             
whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a 
class of persons . . .”); See also Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
 161 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and 
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.”). 
 162 Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[i]t is the collective action of individuals 
having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly protects and, perhaps more 
importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the States’s share 
of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution”). 
 163 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2001) (“There is no 
evidence in the text of the Second Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, that 
the words ‘the people’ have a different connotation within the Second Amendment than 
when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a 
whole, strongly suggests that the words ‘the people’ have precisely the same meaning 
within the Second Amendment as without.”). 
 164 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 165 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 166 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”). 
 167 See, e.g., Jason T. Anderson, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the 
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 
547, 547–48 (2009) (“But the Court left the door open for a new debate to begin in the 
Second Amendment context: what standard of review applies to legislation that restricts 
an individual’s right to bear arms?”). 
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person’s constitutional right, a court will traditionally try to measure the 
importance of the government interest at stake against how closely 
related the law is to that achieving that interest.168  Heller pointedly 
refused to decide what level of review was being used to strike down the 
District of Columbia gun law as unconstitutional, instead stating: “Under 
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm 
in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ 
would fail constitutional muster.”169  In a footnote, Justice Scalia added 
that rational basis would be especially inappropriate as a standard of 
review, as the gun law was within the scope of the Bill of Rights.170  The 
dissent criticized the majority for this purposeful omission by asking 
“[h]ow is a court to determine whether a particular firearm regulation 
(here, the District’s restriction on handguns) is consistent with the 
Second Amendment? What kind of constitutional standard should the 
court use? How high a protective hurdle does the Amendment erect?  
The question matters.” 171  Justice Breyer, in dissent, instead argued for a 
balancing-test to weigh the interests of the government against the 
constitutionally-protected rights of the people.172  The majority, however, 
                                                                                                             
 168 For a more thorough discussion on the standards of review and how they have 
been applied to gun laws after Heller, see Sarah Perkins, District of Columbia v. Heller: 
The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2010) (“The 
Supreme Court traditionally uses three levels of constitutional scrutiny-rationality review, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-in evaluating claims that a person’s 
constitutional rights have been infringed. Each of these three levels of constitutional 
scrutiny contains two prongs in its analysis.  The first prong determines the government 
interest in a particular regulation at issue, while the second prong examines the 
connection between the government interest and the regulation.”). 
 169 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 170 Id. at 629 (“But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when 
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on 
irrational laws . . . . Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to 
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, 
the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear 
arms.”) (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . .”). 
 171 Id. at 687–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 172 Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would simply adopt such an interest-
balancing inquiry explicitly. The fact that important interests lie on both sides of the 
constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control regulation is not a context in 
which a court should effectively presume either constitutionality (as in rational-basis 
review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny).  Rather, where a law significantly 
implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways, the Court 
generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent 
that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important 
governmental interests.) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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firmly rejected such a test as inconsistent with the Court’s past treatment 
of constitutional rights.173 
As a result, lower courts have been inconsistent in determining 
what level of review is now appropriate when ruling on the 
constitutionality of Section 922(g) post-Heller. 174   Some courts have 
continued to apply rational basis, finding that Heller “specifically stated 
the particular regulations were constitutional, as regarding felons and the 
mentally ill, Sections 922(g)(1) and (4), or via analogy to the so called 
‘presumptively lawful regulations.’”175  Nevertheless, the most common 
approach has been to uphold different provisions of the federal gun law 
under some form of intermediate scrutiny.176  Situated between rational 
basis and strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is a “flexible standard 
[that] generally requires the government to establish that the challenged 
law is substantially related to an important governmental interest.”177  
This is the same analysis that the Tenth Circuit applied in Huitron-
Guizar.178 
The primary advantage to using such a test is that it accounts for the 
complexity of the issue, and does make its case solely on the obscure and 
ambiguous intentions of a generation long past.  For the question of 
undocumented residents and firearms, for example, this test profits 
greatly from the fact that our conceptions have dramatically changed 
over the past couple centuries, from when both immigration and gun 
                                                                                                             
 173 Id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). 
 174 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (commenting that courts of appeal have taken various approaches to scrutinizing 
laws regarding firearms, including a substantial burden test, declining to label the level of 
scrutiny being applied, applying a sliding scale test, and intermediate scrutiny). 
 175 United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 396–97, reh’g granted (Dec. 30, 
2010), opinion vacated on reh’g, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (nevertheless concluding 
that intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate because Court dicta could not control 
every gun challenge). 
 176 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443-44, n. 4 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Although it should be noted that several appellate courts, while still 
using intermediate scrutiny, have found creative ways to rework the standard.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir.2010) (developing “a two-prong 
analysis to determine whether a regulation violates a defendant’s Second Amendment 
right to bear arms. A district court must first determine whether the right sought to be 
regulated is within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection . . . . If the district 
court finds that the right is protected by the Second Amendment, the court . . . should 
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether there is a reasonable fit between the 
challenged regulation and a substantial government objective.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks). 
 177 United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009) reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010) and on reh’g en 
banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 178 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1169. 
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laws were of a wholly different magnitude.179  The intermediate scrutiny 
test would take into account, to give just one example, the difficulty in 
firearm registration for a group of people who generally lack valid 
documentation.  The other standards ignore such a critical practical issue 
when deciding Second Amendment rights.  A judge might decide to 
examine any of the myriad of other governmental interests which might 
ultimately be dispositive.  For example, the Government, in a brief for 
one case, offered this justification for keeping guns out of the hands of 
noncitizens: “‘Defense of the State’ or the community, is a duty peculiar 
to the citizen . . . . The alien who has not declared an intention to become 
a citizen has no obligation to defend the State or the community.”180  
Such a statement is of course no longer true, both in light of Heller’s new 
pronouncement of individual (and not militia) gun ownership,181 as well 
as the strong encouragement of noncitizens to serve in the United States 
Armed Forces.182 
Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, a court could no longer ask 
merely “whether the challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating 
the right to bear arms.”183  For example,  “[i]f a state attempted to disarm 
its citizenry completely, such a law might well survive rational basis 
review, assuming the goal is public safety and that a rational legislator 
could conclude that banning all firearms furthers public safety.”184  If we 
analogize this example to the case of noncitizens, we find such a law 
exists in the form of Section 922(g)(5), and courts have routinely upheld 
it as rational.  But because under intermediate scrutiny “[t]he government 
bears the burden of justifying its regulation in the context of heightened 
                                                                                                             
 179 See, e.g., id. (“We know, for instance, that the founders’s notion of citizenship was 
less rigid than ours, largely tied to the franchise, which itself was often based on little 
more than a period of residence and being a male with some capital.”). 
 180 Brief for Respondent at 9-10, State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 879 P.2d 283, No. 
60220-4 (Wash. 1994). 
 181 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text 
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.”). 
 182 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1439 (West) (“A person who has served honorably at any time in 
the armed forces of the United States for a period or periods aggregating one year . . . 
may be naturalized without having resided, continuously immediately preceding the date 
of filing such person’s application, in the United States for at least five years . . .”); See 
also Who Must Register Chart, Selective Service System (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf  (showing that the Selective 
Service Act requires that virtually all male citizens and aliens, even those who are 
undocumented, must register for the United States draft upon their eighteenth birthday.). 
 183 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 717 
(2007). 
 184 Id. 
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scrutiny review,” 185  courts will now be required to examine the 
stereotypes of undocumented residents that led to the passage of such 
gun laws and see if they have any basis in reality.186  For some at least, 
an objective look at facts and statistics may yield a surprisingly fresh 
perspective on immigration in the United States today.  To give just one 
example, studies have shown that native-born Americans are 
significantly more likely to be incarcerated than those born abroad, 
including those who migrate here illegally.187  A court, when presented 
with such statistics, may find that the public safety justification for the 
firearm ban for undocumented residents no longer carries as much force. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are primarily two lines of decisions in recent court holdings 
denying undocumented residents gun rights.  The first type of decision 
presumes that Heller decided that the Second Amendment applies only to 
United States citizens, and anyone outside of the group could not be 
counted as a member of “the people.”188  The second type presumes that 
§ 922(g) is constitutional as a “longstanding prohibition” that is a 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measure[] . . . .”189  Some decisions, 
like the recent Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 
employ both philosophies.  Neither approach is correct. 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Heller, to be sure, 
represented a “dramatic upheaval in the law.”190  Heller did, in fact, as 
the dissent predicted, “throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws 
throughout the United States.”191  What it did not do, however, was strip 
away the rights of noncitizens for the purposes of the Second 
Amendment (as well as the identically-worded First and Fourth 
                                                                                                             
 185 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 186 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, ‘The People’ of the Second Amendment: 
Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1527 (2010) 
(“showcas[ing] the ways in which citizenship restrictions in the firearms context have 
operated as a proxy for racial discrimination, helped construct sinister versions of the 
foreign ‘other’ unfit to wield arms, and contributed to the indeterminacy of citizenship’s 
content.”). 
 187 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at *1 n. 1, United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 
4539663 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (referencing Ruben G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, 
The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation: Incarceration Rates 
among Native and Foreign-Born Men (Immigration Policy Center, Spring 2007)( “In 
contrast to felons and those previously found to be seriously mentally ill, persons 
“illegally or unlawfully in the United States” are no more likely than persons legally in 
the United States to commit violent crimes.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442. 
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Amendments).192  Though critics have suggested that this may represent 
Justice Scalia’s ulterior motive in the Heller decision,193 courts should 
not fashion such a broad holding out of a few words of dicta.  Despite the 
Portillo-Munoz court’s erroneous interpretation, the Supreme Court has 
not overruled the Verdugo-Urquidez “sufficient connections” holding.  
The Verdugo-Urquidez standard therefore remains the primary test of 
who will be counted among “the people” of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, any constitutional right, fundamental or otherwise, 
may still have reasonable restrictions imposed upon it.194  The Heller 
decision commands that, for better or worse, gun control laws must now 
pass some higher level of scrutiny than was previously applied.195  Courts 
should continue to uphold some restrictions in U.S.C. §922(g), such as 
those that prevent former felons from owning firearms as being 
substantially related to an important government purpose.  Indeed, courts 
should tighten restrictions when they are found not to be doing enough to 
support public safety.196  For other restrictions, such as those that prevent 
undocumented residents from owning firearms solely because of their 
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status, courts may have a more difficult time establishing the relationship 
between the group and the “fundamental” right at stake .197 
The Supreme Court once noted that “[t]he legislative history [of the 
firearms act] . . . supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly 
to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that ‘they 
may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to 
society.’” 198   Twenty-five years later, when we read stories in the 
newspaper about new state laws that are “intended to drive illegal 
immigrants from the state by making every aspect of their life 
difficult,”199 we begin to appreciate that maybe the question we should be 
asking is not “Are undocumented residents a threat to our society,” but 
instead, “Is our society becoming a threat to them?”200 
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